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Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine certain central themes common to literature on technology 
transfer such as technological independence, appropriateness of technology and 
completeness of technology transfer. It is claimed that these and associated concepts 
form a coherent paradigm. The critique is based on contextual and historical analysis. 
Towards the end the paper deals with the central role of transnational corporation in 
transfer of technology.  
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Paradigm: “[in the philosophy of science] a generally accepted model of how 
ideas relate to one another, forming a conceptual framework within which  
scientific research is carried out.” ENCARTA 
 
“Technology transfer is a contradiction in terms like military intelligence or 
perhaps nuclear safety.” (Darton 1986, p. 248) 
 
“…`technology’ is not an artefact that may be taken off the shelf and applied 
to the process of production in an automatic fashion. On the contrary… 
`technology’ can only really be understood in an evolutionary sense, 
constantly changing as a result of both the operation of its own dynamic in 
specific circumstances, and of contextual conditions.” (Clark 1985, p. 190)  
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Introduction 
The literature on technology transfer reveals certain common themes and elements 
that may be characterised as a paradigm. There are at least three main themes that can 
be identified as follows: 
1) Technological dependence versus independence 
2) Appropriate versus inappropriate technology 
3) Complete versus incomplete technology transfer 
There are other related issues as well. For instance the use of word `transfer‟ instead 
of trade or acquisition implies that the movement of technology across national 
borders is or should be subject to different rules and laws compared to movement of 
goods and services. More specifically it implies that it is primarily the duty or the job 
of governments to initiate technology acquisition from abroad. Thus it is a reflection 
of the mood in development literature after WWII, which broadly speaking was pro 
government intervention and economic planning. The independence movement in 
many ex-colonies enhanced this mood for a blind faith in state intervention and 
planning. For instance, as we shall see below, the debate on appropriateness of 
imported technology assumed that without government intervention, technology 
`transferred‟ by TNCs will be inappropriate. We shall discuss all these elements 
below. 
 
Technological Dependence and Independence 
One of the main themes of technology transfer paradigm (TTP) concerns 
technological dependence and independence. There are several issues here. First is the 
concept itself and its empirical possibility. Another relates to the process of going 
from a state of dependence to independence. The definition of technological 
independence itself is problematic, as it contains the possibility that a country may be 
at a low level of technological development or at a high level. It may imply the 
possibility that such a country, if it wishes to develop its technology further, can do so 
without any technological imports from abroad. Implicitly this means the country has 
a well developed R&D infrastructure and innovation capability. As we shall see both 
the empirical possibility and conceptual desirability of such a state is very doubtful. 
First we shall see how the authors sympathetic to the idea try to define the concept. 
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Inspired by the emerging neo-Marxist and dependency theories of development 
UNCTAD (1975) defines technological dependence as a condition in which a country 
(1) has a low level of innovative activity as measured by the number of patents owned 
in the country, (2) lacks high-level skills needed to make technological choices and 
(3) lacks low-level skill needed to operate machinery. These are reasonable 
characteristics of a country at a low level of economic and technological development. 
The reason why this condition is called technological `dependence‟ is not made clear, 
although references are made to the cost of imported technologies, especially when it 
involves transnational corporations (TNC) [pp. 265-271]. In order to get a better idea 
of this issue we return to Frances Stewart, a prominent expert on the issue who 
approaches the concept first by defining its opposite, i.e. technological dependence: 
“Technological dependence arises where the major source of a country‟s technology 
comes from abroad. Most advanced nations specialise and trade in technology, so 
many advanced nations could, in this sense, be described as technologically 
dependent…” (Stewart 1978, p. 116) 
 
So far we have learnt that technological dependence is undesirable in spite of the fact 
that some advanced countries may be described as dependent. The question: is there 
any technologically independent country? The answer: not really. 
“Countries which are heavy importers and exporters of technology like most advanced 
countries are clearly in some sense dependent on foreign technology just as they are 
on foreign goods…” (Ibid, p. 118) 
 
The author continues further by characterising the above situation as interdependence. 
Thus dependence is defined as one-way interdependence. The question is: can we 
easily find any country that is a net exporter of technology, as we would a country 
with a positive balance of trade?  
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This assumes that it is possible for each country to achieve technological 
independence. While historically there are precedents of technological independence 
(e.g. Britain in the 19
th
 century and to a limited extent USA, Japan and the former 
Soviet Union) the paradigm is clearly based on closed economy assumptions. If we 
look at any of the above cases it is clear that none of them achieved technological 
independence in the long run. 
 
It is possible to conceive of successful technology transfer and technological 
independence in particular sectors of the economy where the forward and backward 
linkages are weak or in the service sector where domestic suppliers are easy to 
organise. But when we consider a complex product such as a car, that uses thousands 
of parts, it is almost impossible to conceive of complete technological independence. 
 
We believe that most traditional technological transfer models which assume a linear 
stage scheme from introduction to diffusion and absorption (see, for instance UNCTC 
1988) are based on closed-economy assumption. This may have been suitable in 19
th
 
century and early 20
th
 century. However, the post-World War II period has 
experienced greater globalisation in world economy. Further, these models are based 
on a narrow definition of technology (i.e. process technology). If we relax these 
definitions and assumptions, the traditional models fail to explain technology transfer. 
 
If we relax these assumptions and assume open economies and a broader definition of 
technology, new avenues are opened up. For instance, under open economy 
assumption a country with a system of flexible exchange rates may find it difficult to 
attract FDI in all sectors of the economy as TNC‟s may prefer to change outsourcing 
of raw materials and sub-assemblies to countries with devalued exchange rates. 
 
These models may be a fair description of the technological transfer process in 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 century. For instance, USA, Germany, Russia and Japan began 
industrialisation in the second half of the 19
th
 century. They all relied on import 
substitution (IS) strategy using tariffs as protective measures.  
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In the 20
th
 century the prime examples of IS has been the former Soviet Union, Brazil, 
India, Iran and Nigeria. The former Soviet Union used the licensing method to 
transfer technology. It is clear from the ideological perspective of the Soviet Union 
that technology should be transferred with a view to economic independence from the 
imperialist west. For Japan a similar perspective existed as Japan since the Maiji 
Restoration in the 1870‟s was desperate to stay independent and avoid colonisation by 
the west. China‟s attempt at economic independence in the 1950‟s shadowed the 
Soviet experience. 
 
To a lesser extent Japan also used licensing (Stewart, 1978). This method of 
technology transfer is suitable in a number of sectors of the economy where brand 
names, trademarks and ultimately quality control are not essential. These sectors 
include engineering industries (and in general capital goods sector) and those 
consumer goods industries that at early stage of development of a country where the 
object is to meet „basic needs‟, do not depend on brand loyalty, product differentiation 
etc. e.g. textiles, hygiene goods such as soaps. Thus technology could be transferred 
in the second half of the 19
th
 century and the first half of the 20
th
 century through 
licensing. 
 
The post-war period presents a different picture altogether. In this period, both in the 
North and South we witnessed rising per-capita incomes, consumerism and rising 
expectations as well as changing lifestyles associated with the rise of sub-cultures as 
well as social movements (civil rights, Women‟s Liberation). 
 
Consumer products, product differentiation, quality, etc. in the context of rising per-
capita incomes and increasing competition (Auerbach, 1988) made licensing a less 
attractive route for technology transfer. 
 
Thus licensing that essentially led to some kind of technological independence 
(through complete transfer of technologies) became less relevant as the emerging 
industries in the South had to cater to more sophisticated customers in an increasingly 
competitive world economy.  
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In the post-war period we witness an increased role in technology transfer for FDI, 
joint ventures, franchising, management contracts and turnkey projects. 
 
Thus, compared with the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century methods of 
technology transfer, we are faced today with a multitude of methods. These methods 
are based on factors ranging from consumer loyalty to brands to the complexity of 
technical know-how. A recent study of technology transfer in car industry in Egypt 
(Taha 2002) shows how this industry from the end of World War II to the present has 
moved from a strategy of complete (process) technology transfer to a more market 
and export oriented strategy that may not require complete process technology 
transfer. 
 
Appropriate and Inappropriate Technology 
Appropriate/inappropriate embraces three basic interrelated elements: 
1) Appropriateness in relation to factor endowment of the host country, e.g. 
capital intensive technology not suitable for labour abundant countries. 
2) `Right‟/`wrong‟ products (consumption technology), e.g. luxury products as 
opposed to mass consumption goods (UNCTAD 1975, pp. 271- 274) 
3) Regional/sectoral impact: e.g. urban versus rural (intermediate technology) 
(Schumacher 1973, Clark 1985) 
 
A further point often discussed in this connection is the cost of imported technologies, 
particularly if TNCs are the transfer agents. We will now concentrate on the three 
points above and reserve the discussion of TNC for a later section. 
Schumacher was the first person to raise the question of appropriate or intermediate 
technology in his seminal work Small Is Beautiful (Schumacher 1973). Although 
intended as a work targeted at Less Developed Countries (LDCs) it became an icon of 
the 1960's counter cultures, i.e. it was interpreted as an alternative organisational 
principle as opposed to corporations, large multinational corporations, even 
bureaucracies. 
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The basic motif in Schumacher‟s book was the contrast between modern technology 
(used mostly in western industrialised countries) and ancient technologies still in use 
in LDCs, particularly in rural areas but also in small-scale urban industry. 
 
Figure 1 contrasts the two technologies. As opposed to these two kinds of 
technologies, Schumacher suggests an intermediate technology (IT) that would raise 
productivity at lower costs (compared to advance technology), use local resources, 
skills, labour pools and that, further, would be easy to operate, maintain etc. 
 
Thus the idea of intermediate technology seemed suited to conditions in many LDCs, 
where there are abundant labour resources, low skill levels, low productivity, lower 
educational levels, low levels of capital formation etc. The idea was to raise 
productivity levels, thus income, with minimum cost in terms of imported capital, raw 
materials, skilled labour etc. Although Schumacher‟s ideas were ignored by most 
development economists when they appeared first in the 1970's, they gradually came 
to be taken seriously partly due to the following circumstances:  
1) The general disillusionment with state-led large scale Import-Substitution-
Industrialisation (ISI) strategy of economic development, which produced a fairly 
high growth rate (e.g. Brazil) but at the expense of high unemployment rates and 
worsening income distribution. This led to the rise of Basic Needs Approach. 
2) The rise of Newly Industrialised Countries in South East Asia where high growth 
rates were accompanied by a more equitable income distribution and higher 
employment levels. 
3) „Urban Bias‟, a policy adopted by many LDC‟s, which systematically gives 
priority to the urban sector compared to the rural (Lipton 1977). 
 
As the ideas of IT were becoming more and more appreciated a major criticism from 
the Marxist camp came from Arghiri Emmanuel (1982). He basically dismissed the 
idea on the grounds that IT adoption is equivalent to denial of advanced technology to 
LDCs. 
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Figure 1: Advanced and Backward Technologies 
 
ADVANCED 
TECHNOLOGY 
BACKWARD 
TECHNOLOGY 
THE NATURE Complex Simple 
EQUIPMENT Machinery Tools 
MAINTENANCE 
OPERATION 
Complicated Easy 
SKILL LEVEL 
Highly Skilled or 
Specialised 
Skilled, not necessarily 
specialised 
FACTOR-INTENSITY Fairly Capital Intensive Labour Intensive 
RAW MATERIALS 
Local, but largely 
imported 
Mostly local 
PRODUCTIVITY High Low 
COST Expensive Cheap 
 
 
Both the total embracing of IT and its total rejection is false for the following reasons: 
1) The idea of intermediate technology is both industry specific and stage of 
development specific. There are certain industries and sectors of LDCs that 
may benefit from IT, e.g. the rural sector or the small-scale industry in urban 
areas. However, other industries may require large scale as a matter of 
efficiency and productivity as many fields of manufacturing exhibit economies 
of scale. Also countries at a certain stage of development, e.g. low income, 
predominantly agricultural societies, can benefit tremendously from IT. When 
this stage is passed modern technology may become appropriate as higher 
growth rates in income per head make large scale production possible through 
market (demand) creation. 
2) Schumacher‟s ideas represent a broad generalisation of the condition in LDCs 
in the 1950's and 1960's, which no longer holds true. The fact is that several 
countries in LDCs industrialised very rapidly with minimum of urban bias 
(India and China are prime examples). 
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3) Total rejection of IT is based on technological and economic determinism. 
This approach tries to idealise modern technology with total disregard to 
normal conditions in which technology is applied (Shamsavari 1991). 
 
Now we offer a more developed critique of appropriate-inappropriate dimension of 
the TRP.  
1) As far as the factor endowment aspect of the debate is concerned one can 
claim that the experience of TNC in low income countries show that 
adaptation of developed country technology to low wage economies has not 
been a problem e.g. American company operations in Mexico as far back as 
1950s. If we focus on profit-seeking organisations such as TNCs it is clear that 
lack of attention to factor endowment issue, e.g. more abundant labour in 
LDCs will cost these companies dearly if they rely on capital intensive 
technology. Also historical studies of technology transfer from Britain to the 
US in 19
th
. Century show that initiating companies, American or British, 
adapted imported technology to American factor endowment, e.g. greater 
availability of wood and waterways (rivers) [Rosenberg 1976]. 
2) Labour-intensive methods are not necessarily appropriate for LDC as they 
may require hiring expensive, highly skilled supervisory labour power. This 
point raises issues about the usefulness of factor intensity concept (a standard 
tool in economists‟ toolbox) without further refinements, e.g. differences in 
types and grades of labour as well as capital.  
3) Wrong product concept, apart from representing a `patronising‟ frame of mind 
among DC and LDC intellectuals, is misleading for a number of reasons. A 
luxury or in fact any consumer durable may encourage work in order to earn 
enough income to buy the product. If the product is also technically 
sophisticated, e.g. a car, it may add to skills pool in the form of car mechanics. 
4) Sectoral impact, rural-urban in particular, is significant in the light of 
Schumacher‟s view on technology and society, which one can only admire. 
The realities of Third World industrialisation show that an initial period of 
`inappropriate‟ technology may be necessary before appropriate technology 
becomes both desirable and possible. Example: rising environmental 
awareness in China after considerable `dirty‟ industrialisation (environmental 
Kuznets U-curve).  
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Complete versus Incomplete Technology Transfer  
Both the definition of technology and technological transfer are problematic. We have 
dealt with the first in Shamsavari et al. (2002), where we contrasted the narrow and 
broad definitions of technology. Here we will deal with the problematic nature of 
technology transfer. 
 
According to one authority on the subject, the difficulty of defining technology 
transfer arises from the issue of completeness of technology transfer. 
 
At the one end, technology transfer may simply be the 
movement of technology from one location to another or from 
one use to another, or a combination of the two (Smith, 1980). 
On the other end, technology transfer must be “nothing less 
than the transfer of the capacity to understand and develop the 
introduced technology,” (Komoda, 1986 as quoted by Chen 
1996, p. 182.) 
 
Chen follows the above by pointing out that based on Komoda‟s views, technology 
transfer cannot be complete unless it is completely adopted and absorbed without 
outside assistance, i.e. until the transferee is able to operate and maintain the process 
independently and furthermore can „improve, extend and develop the technology 
originally transferred‟. He continues by stating that „Technology transfer is not just 
acquiring of knowledge in production, but also building up of a nation‟s technological 
capabilities. The difficulties of defining technology transfer arise largely from the fact 
that technology is knowledge, not a product. The transfer process and mechanism are 
necessarily difficult to define operationally.‟ (Chen, ibid, p. 182) 
 
It is not clear from the above what Chen‟s position is about complete and incomplete 
technology. 
The traditional literature on technology transfer (Stewart 1978, Adikibi 1984, UNCTC 
1988, Souder 1990) defines the latter as a process which goes through three stages of 
introduction, adoption and absorption. It is not often clear whether or not this scheme 
is supposed to apply to a few sectors of the economy or the entire economy. Complete 
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technology transfer to one or a few sectors, as opposed to complete technology 
transfer to the entire economy, are two entirely separate issues. 
 
It is possible and may be desirable to transfer technology completely in a few sectors 
of the economy. The obvious candidate sectors would be those that rely on locally 
available factors of production and may be low-tech, e.g. textiles, construction sector, 
building materials, detergents, timber and wood, paper, steel, food, beverage and 
tobacco, etc. The possibility of transfer of technology in these sectors is based on the 
low level of technology and availability of local factors of production, e.g. land, 
mineral deposits and labour. In more high-tech sectors such as household durables and 
cars, technology transfer is both possible and desirable. It is possible as many MNC 
are happy to grant turnkey contracts (CKD) to host countries. It is desirable as many 
LDCs will benefit from saving in foreign exchange and some degree of employment 
and education of the labour force. This stage of technology transfer in the IS strategy 
has been referred to as the easy phase of IS by Hirshman (1968). The second and 
more difficult phase requires development of supplier industries (Hirshman, 1968). As 
many supplier industries require a minimum size to operate efficiently (MES), a size 
which depends on the extent of the domestic market, the second phase may not be 
feasible in a great number of small developing countries. Thus for a large number of 
LDCs, particularly the least developed countries (LLDC‟s) that number between 50-
60 countries, including island, land-locked, sparsely-populated countries located in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and the Pacific Ocean), the second phase of IS 
(corresponding to adoption-absorption stages of technology transfer) may not be a 
feasible option. 
 
Thus, complete technology transfer in a few sectors of the economy may or may not 
be possible due to factors such as the size of the economy, economies of scale, etc. 
When we consider complete technology transfer to the whole economy the issue 
becomes problematic. 
 
The possibility of such complete technology transfer is not only dependent upon the 
size of the economy and its stage of development but also on the constraints relating 
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to the nature of technology and its availability to transfer. Another factor is the sector 
specificity of technology. 
 
In certain manufacturing sectors, e.g. simple household durables such as vacuum 
cleaners or in certain chemical industries, the raw materials and parts used are small 
and limited. In these sectors it is easy to achieve complete technology transfer, 
especially if the raw materials are locally available (e.g. the petrochemical industry in 
oil producing countries). 
 
In other sectors where the final product either requires a great number of parts, 
components and subassemblies (car) or the parts used are very high-tech (PCs) 
complete technology transfer is either inconceivable or very difficult. 
 
The nature of technology in the 19
th
 century and the first half of the 20
th
 century made 
it easier to transfer as it involved largely process technology, which could be 
transferred through licensing agreements. These technologies did not involve product 
differentiation, brands, quality control, management technologies etc. They were 
largely non-propriety technologies. It also involved sectors such as capital goods, 
business to business transactions in which advertising, brand loyalty etc, play an 
insignificant role compared to quality and technical specification. The reason that the 
US, Germany and Japan in the late 19
th
 century were successful in technology transfer 
had to do with building up the basic industries such as steel and shipbuilding. 
 
The possibility of technology transfer in the 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century in 
certain countries with large internal markets and in the capital goods sector were 
rooted in the nature of technologies transferred, the originators of technology transfer, 
which were large organisations that engaged in licensing agreements as the only way 
to maximise returns on their investment in the context of world economic conditions 
that favoured autarky. Apart from the fact that post-war developments favour greater 
trade liberalisation, etc. it is hard to conceive of complete technology transfer either in 
certain sectors or in the whole economy, in view of modern trends in technological 
change. 
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How is it possible to transfer technology completely when the technology is rapidly 
changing? In the rapidly changing technologies in the world today complete 
technological transfer is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not feasible due to the 
speed of change. It is not desirable due to the fact that many LDCs may be left out if 
they insist on non-propriety technology transfer. 
 
Technology transfer involves transfer of knowledge at five levels of technology, 
product, process, marketing, finance and quality (UNCTC 1988, Shamsavari, et.al, 
2002). The emphasis of traditional technology transfer models was largely on process 
technology. This was justified as the nature of technologies and the mode of their 
transfer, especially before World War II, involved strictly process technological 
know-how at the expense of other aspects.  
 
Complete technology transfer may be desirable and possible in some sectors of any 
national economy, but such transfer to an entire economy is neither possible nor 
desirable. It is impossible, because of the Alice-in-Wonderland effect: In order to stay 
at the same spot you have to run very fast, i.e. technology is a constantly evolving and 
expanding, this being particularly true at the present time. 
 
It is also impossible because depending on the size of the economy, certain sectors 
may not be economical to expand, e.g. car production, because of economies of scale.  
Even if this was possible it would not be desirable because it implies (by its nature) a 
closed economy (Shamsavari and Taha 2005). 
 
 
Technology Transfer in Historical Perspective 
If we look at technology transfer from a historical perspective a number of significant 
factors emerges: 
1) Technology transfer historically has been from sector to sector, company to 
company, within the sector as well as country to country. 
2) Stages and mechanisms of transmission have varied widely from industry to 
industry and in stages of economic development. 
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3)  In certain industries transfer of technology is intimately bound up with the 
nature of technology itself. 
4) A most common form of transfer these days is between supplier and customer 
in industrial markets. 
 
The following cases and examples should help to demonstrate the above-mentioned 
points: 
Textile industry in Europe in 17-19th centuries: technology transfer occurred between 
many countries (UK, France, Germany, Holland) largely through migration of skilled 
labour (Jeremy 1991). 
 
In many industries, technology transfer from Europe to US in 19th. century, involved 
firm to firm transmission and adaptation to domestic factor endowment took place as 
a matter of course in response to market mechanisms (Rosenberg 1976).  
 
Unlike the case of textile technology that was transmitted through migration of a large 
number of artisans, technology transfer in iron and steel industry required a smaller 
number of highly educated engineers (Jeremy 1991). 
 
The rise of a number of industries beginning in mid to late 19th century led to 
technologies whose appropriate scales of operation by their nature were truly global, 
e.g. electricity generation, hence the urgent need to come up with an internationally 
accepted unit of measurement (Teich 1989). 
 
In communication and transportation industries it does not make much sense to talk 
about technology transfer, as transfer is part and parcel of the industry itself (one 
cannot make a call to another country without the technology to receive it having been 
already installed at the destination): 
 
“The nature of early telegraph technology contributed to its transfer as well. Though 
some of the early entrepreneurs, notably Morse, initially sought to keep knowledge 
about their systems secret, the necessity of hiring literate operators who either 
possessed or could easily learn the necessary electrical knowledge to keep the systems 
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running made it difficult to keep knowledge of the technology proprietary.” (Jeremy 
1991, p. 113)   
 
The nature and mechanisms of technology transfer have changed throughout history. 
We can distinguish four historical stages: pre-industrial, early Industrialisation, high 
Industrialisation and post-industrial (See Fig. 2). 
 
In the pre-industrial stage agriculture is the main sector, where technology transfer is 
largely through informal education; in non-agricultural activities it may involve 
copying and translation of texts and some migration. 
During early industrialisation technology is simple, raw materials local, needs mass 
and basic (e.g. textiles, hygiene goods, paper, food processing and construction).  In 
this stage process and product technology are dominant. Technology transfer takes 
place through imports of machinery and labour. 
 
Figure 2: Technology Levels and Transfer in Historical Perspective 
 Level of 
Technology/Sectors 
Type of 
technology 
Methodology 
of 
production 
Mechanism 
of 
Technology 
Transfer 
Pre-industrial Simple: 
Agriculture, 
Handicrafts, some 
Project 
 
Product Craft Informal 
Education, 
Labour 
Migration 
Early 
Industrialisation 
Low: Textile, 
Hygiene, 
Construction, 
Food, Paper 
Process, 
Product, 
some 
Management 
Batch, some 
Mass 
Machinery 
Import, 
Show how, 
non- 
Education 
Late 
Industrialisation 
Medium: Iron & 
Steel, Energy, 
Railways 
Product, 
Process, 
Management 
Large Batch, 
Mass 
License,  
Post-industrial High: IT, Bio 
Technology 
Nanotechnology 
Product, 
Brand 
Management, 
Quality 
Lean, Mass License, 
FDI, Joint 
Venture 
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In the high industrial phase we see the advent of high technology and machine based 
production at large scale (e.g. iron and steel, oil and gas, assembly of machine tools, 
consumer durables, automotive industry). Product (esp. brand) and quality control 
technologies dominate. Technology transfer takes place through licenses, machinery 
supply contracts, turnkey and management contracts. Import of parts and raw material 
is common and know how and show how plus some FDI begin to acquire 
considerable importance. We observe growing importance of both foreign trade and 
investment. 
 
Post-industrial stage involves very high technology, brand management, quality 
control, marketing and R&D (e.g. IT, bio-technology, nanotechnology, also modular 
production of sophisticated consumer products such as cars). Technology transfer 
takes place through some licensing, FDI and joint ventures. We see a much greater 
internationalisation of production and trade involving globally- integrated production 
and distribution. 
 
When we consider North-South process of technology transfer in 20
th
 century we can 
identify three historical models of technology transfer as follows:  
 
These models can be distinguished by certain factors, i.e. the geographical area, the 
route or mechanism of technology transfer, the extent of state intervention, trade 
strategy and policies of the host country. 
 
1. The Soviet (East-European) Model: This was used initially by the former 
Soviet Union (SU). But it was copied in Eastern Europe and India and China 
after WWII. It aimed at Import Substitution (IS) with primary channel of 
transfer being licensing agreements (e.g. production of Lada cars under license 
with Fiat). As the SU was not a market economy tariff was not used as an 
instrument of protection of domestic industry. State intervention was supreme. 
 
2. The Brazilian (Latin American) model: This model also aimed at import 
substitution but relied heavily on wholly-owned FDI (e.g. American Ford 
company investments in the 1950-60s). Trade policies included tariff, quota 
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and tax-subsidy incentives. Thus the role of state was important but private 
sector also played a significant role especially in supplier industries. 
 
3. The Korean (Asian) Model: This was a complete departure from the above 
two in that both the aims and routes of technology transfer were different. It 
aimed at export promotion (EP) and used joint-ventures with Japanese and 
American TNCs. The extent of state intervention was lower than LA model, 
while private sector played a major role. Trade policies included mostly tariff 
and subsidies.  
See Fig. 3 for a summary of the above. 
 
Figure 3: Historical Models of Technology Transfer in 20
th
 Century 
 
 
 
Means of  
Transfer 
Role of 
Government 
Export- 
oriented 
Regions 
Soviet Model License Total Zero SU, 
Eastern 
Europe 
Latin 
American 
Model 
FDI Large to 
Medium 
Small to 
Medium 
Brazil and 
Mexico 
Asian 
Model 
Joint venture Medium Large Japan,  
S. Korea 
 
 
The Central Role of FDI in Technology Transfer 
FDI has often been considered as a major vehicle of technology transfer because 
of its packaged (bundled) nature. This is true, but the role of TNC in technology 
transfer may involve other factors that are more important especially in the light of 
above critical discussion of the paradigm: 
Through the necessity of adaptation of some or all of the technology transfer 
package the TNC, as if by an invisible hand‟, delivers innovation and R&D to the 
host economy. TNCs may also be encouraged to form partnerships, joint venture 
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and alliances with domestic firms in the host country or enter into linkages with 
national supplier companies, thus acceleration transfer of technology (Shamsavari 
2005). 
 
Furthermore, TNCs may transfer technology from their affiliates abroad back to 
the home country operations. This is reverse technology transfer and is a hallmark 
of globally integrated production (complex) as opposed to multi-domestic (simple, 
stand-alone) model.  
 
“International business can be thought of as a package, combining 
resources to produce goods and/or services. With international 
business, by definition, knowledge is diffused within an 
organisation. And…typically the knowledge flows have stemmed 
from parent onwards. However, as international business has 
evolved there came to be a two-way street, where the parent 
obtained knowledge from an existing affiliate or a newly acquired 
one.” (Wilkins 2005, p. 141) 
 
In this context it is also interesting to contrast the latest view of UNCTAD (2000) 
compared to the one mentioned above (UNCTAD 1975). According to the former, 
FDI is not the most expensive form of technology transfer, but the least costly: 
 
“FDI may be a more expensive mode of transfer than 
externalised modes (e.g. licensing)…, the latest and most 
valuable technologies, however, are not available on license… 
and FDI can provide an effective means of updating 
technologies quickly, which is important for countries that lack 
the ability to improve and innovate on imported technologies. 
Taking these factors into account, FDI may often prove to be the 
cheapest long-term means of technology transfer.” (UNCTAD 
2000, p. 173) 
 
It is interesting to observe that we have come a long way since the heyday of 
dependency theory, as the issue of TNC and cost of transfer associated with it is 
now definitively resolved in favour of the latter.  
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